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Finding a New Regulatory Pathway for the Old
Labyrinth of Health Planning
John D. Blum, J.D., M.S. *
The past twenty-five years have seen a
proliferation of health laws and regulations that are
indicative of the complexities of a health delivery
system driven by science and technology, and often
shaped in unintended ways by the very laws and
-4 policies designed to control it. The history of current
health insurance reform debates underscores the
massive challenges of crafting legislation in health
that expands coverage while balancing the two other
elements of the health triad: cost and quality. While
a vision of what the US health system should be
remains illusive, there is no hesitation on the part of
policy makers, legislators and regulators to continually conceptualize and
proliferate new laws to address the current problem of the day, and
seemingly spawn an endless sea of regulatory acronyms. This essay is
written from an observation sparked by working in this field for many
years; namely, that there are really very few ideas in health regulation that
are novel, and what passes for new, innovative approaches is often a mere
iteration of prior ideas and programs. The insight that new ideas frequently
are recycled notions from the past is not rooted in a critical vein, but rather
from a conviction that returning to past ideas can actually be a progressive
step, and that those past efforts are often too quickly discarded as the
victims of shifts in regulatory ideology. This essay will make the argument
that two ideas from the past should be embraced by health regulators, one to
foster a more rational vision of the delivery system, and the other to
improve the administrative processes to more effectively actualize a
coherent regulatory vision. The first topic calls for a return to the halcyon
days of 1970s regulatory philosophy, health planning, and the second lies in
the more jurisprudential area of administrative law, the adoption of new
governance, management-based regulation or responsive regulation as a
mechanism to revitalize health planning.
* John J. Waldron Research Professor, Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
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Historically, health planning at both the federal and state levels emerged
from a concern that the market was not an adequate vehicle to control the
run away expansion of health facilities and the commensurate costs
associated with such expansions. These concerns date back to 1946 with the
enactment of the federal Hill-Burton program that provided funds for new
hospital construction, contingent on the adoption of a state health plan to
evaluate the respective projects1. Subsequent to Hill-Burton, the 1966
Public Health Service Amendments created state and local planning
agencies that were each individually mandated to create plans to oversee
health care facility growth, but these entities lacked the statutory power to
implement their suggestions. In 1964, New York State enacted the first
Certificate of Need law, quickly followed by Rhode Island, Maryland and
California. The state-based Certificate of Need laws regulated facility
capacity and service changes and were enforced through denial of an
operating license, court injunctions and fines. In the late 1960s, area-wide
planning was introduced through voluntary efforts to encourage regional
collaborative planning under amendments to the U.S. Public Health Act
(section 318): the Regional Medical Program was created, with a focus on
heart disease, cancer and stroke. In 1972, Congress created the Section 1122
program that required participating states to evaluate Medicare capital
expenditures, with the potential of payment denial for failure to comply.
These efforts culminated in 1974 with the passage of the federal National
Health Planning and Resource Development Act (NHPRDA) that mandated
states to enact Certificate of Need Laws or have in place some mechanism
for review of building projects and capital expenditures.2 The NHPRDA
was unique in that it is a piece of federal health legislation that in its
preamble actually recognized health as a basic right of all citizens but from
an operational standpoint attempted to create a single unitary network of
state and regional agencies to engage in health planning, resource
development, and service review, and expand such efforts outside hospital
settings. In reality, the NHPRDA created an elaborate network of new
regional planning entities referred to as Health System Agencies (HSAs)
that were intended to work with newly mandated state wide actors. While
valuable studies of regional health activities emerged, particularly in the
data collection area, the bureaucratic structure which the 1974 law created
was overwhelmingly complex and duplicative of state initiatives in the area.
The federal mandate spurted and never reached its full potential, because it
was far too bureaucratic and multi-layered to work efficiently. More often
1. Fred J.Hellinger, The Effect of Certificate of Need Laws on Hospital Beds and Health
Care Expenditures- An EmpiricalAnalysis, 15 AM. J. OF MANAGED CARE 737, 737-44, (Oct.
2009).
2. Pub. L. No. 93-641.
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than not, project review and evaluations became mere regulatory paper
tigers, mandating complex applications and resting on suspect planning
measurements such as bed need criterion. Many state boards were
dominated by political considerations, where project approval was the norm
and the process was marked by classic cases of legislative interference and
judicial challenges. Questions of affectedness of C.O.N. laws hounded the
state programs from their inception, and some argued that the bureaucracy
of review and approval caused delays that resulted in increasing costs.
By the time the Regan administration came into power in the early
1980s, three states, Utah, Idaho, and New Mexico, repealed their C.O.N.
laws without any subsequent federal sanctions. In 1986, Congress struck
down the mandate that tied the existence of C.O.N. laws to receipt of
federal funds and ten additional states repealed their respective review
programs.3 Ironically Louisiana, the one state, that never had a C.O.N.
mandate and only had an 1122 program, actually enacted a C.O.N. law in
1991. Interestingly enough, thirty-six states still retain C.O.N. laws in some
manner, and these pieces of legislation are not dormant, but rather continue
to be amended on a regular basis.4 Typically the threshold amounts for
mandatory review have been increased, but the scope of state reviews have
been expanded to include long term care, ambulatory health programs and
particular pieces of technology.
In 2010, now in the shadow of health reform, the merits of state C.O.N.
laws remain points of contention. In recent years, as might be expected,
numerous studies have been conducted on the merits of these laws, with
results that are less than conclusive. For example, in a 2002 JAMA article, a
study was reported that medical outcomes for coronary artery bypass graft
surgery were better in states with C.O.N. laws.5 On the other hand, in a
policy report on competition in health care, the US Federal Trade
Commission and the Department of Justice concluded that C.O.N. laws
were ineffective and should be abolished in favor of competitive health
markets, as more effective cost and quality control mechanisms.6
Ironically, hospital associations have supported C.O.N. laws as a viable
mechanism to control costs as opposed to organized medicine that views the
process as a bureaucratic structure that stifles innovation and frustrates the
3. Hellinger, supra note 1.
4. National Conference of State Legislatures, Certificate of Need: State Health Laws and
Programs: Certificate of Need, updated May 2009, available at http://204.131.235.67/
programs/health/cert-need.htm.
5. Mary Vaughan-Sarrazin, Edward L. Hannan, Carol J. Gormley, and Gary Rosenthal,
Mortality in Medicare Beneficiaries Following Coronary Artery Bypass Graft Surgery in
States With and Without Certificate of Need Regulation, 288 JAMA 1859, 1859-66 (2002).
6. U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE AND U.S. FED. TRADE COMM'N, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A
DOSE OF COMPETITION, CERTIFICATE OF NEED Chapter 8 (2004), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/healthcare/040723healthcarerpt.pdf.
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proliferation of ambulatory care programs, particularly specialty hospitals.
A number of states have launched studies of the future of C.O.N. laws, and
to an extent the results of these efforts mirror the regulatory biases of the
respective jurisdictions. Two reports of particular note come out of
Washington State and Illinois, respectively.7 While the two reports contain
features unique to the health systems in these states, three major
commonalities emerge. One common feature is the recognition that C.O.N
procedures need to be streamlined but also focused on a wider array of
health actors. Second, the two reports emphasize that state agencies must be
more focused on special needs populations and on the institutions that serve
as the state's safety net. Third, and perhaps most notably, both reports call
for C.O.N. to be refocused on its core mission in the area of health
planning.
Somewhere along the journey of C.O.N. laws, these statutes became
dominated by process review and evaluation, and the core function of
creating state and regional health plans dropped from the agenda of these
agencies, or planning was turned over to state bureaucrats whose best
efforts were foiled by political realities. Even in the face of the best
systems of evaluation, the regulatory vision was myopic and often resulted
in piecemeal regulatory oversight that too often did little to prevent a highly
disjointed, uncoordinated healthsystem. Powerful market forces trumped
health planning and, in the face of these regulations, large powerful hospital
groupings emerged, proverbial bigger ships sailing on their own expanding
bottoms in a process dominated by politics. Institutional dominance
prevailed and was not foiled by health planning, and innovations like
clinical integration emerged as tools not to respond to community need, but
rather as processes designed to insure competitive advantage and market
dominance. The health planning movement did little to stem the tide of
eroding municipal and county health systems that were all too often victims
of incompetent local politics and epicenters of patronage, strangled by
unions bent on retaining jobs, rather than promoting public health.
No doubt there will be those who will argue that cost and quality
problems stem from over regulation and that the last thing needed is a
bureaucratic pathway for health planning. Others may argue that it is legal
constraints, particularly from antitrust laws, that have kept institutions from
pursuing more unified, rationalized visions of regional health delivery. Still
others may point to New York State where the so-called Berger
Commission took over health planning and actually has become active in
7. SENATOR SUSAN BARRETT & REPRESENTATIVE LISA DUGAN, THE ILLINOIS TASK FORCE
REPORT ON HEALTH PLANNING REFORM, available at http://www.idph.state.il.us/
tfhpr/reports/TFHPR/ 20Final%2OReport.pdf; see also COMM'N ON THE EFFICACY OF THE
CON PROGRAM, FINAL REPORT: AN ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF THE CERTIFICATE OF
NEED IN GEORGIA (2007) (an example of recent C.O.N. analysis).
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closing and downsizing facilities as far too intrusive.8 Or some many see
what is transpiring north of our border in Ontario: the adoption of Local
Health Integration Networks (LHIN), mandating hospital accountability
agreements for uses of public monies as being counterproductive to
creativity, and even endangering fiscal viability.9
It would be naive to argue that interjecting more meaningful health
planning into state bureaucracies will solve all the ills of the delivery
system, but if structured in a meaningful way, health planning-could make
our current system far more rational and, in turn, more responsive to public
health needs. The argument for revitalized health planning herein has seven
components. To begin with, as sadly demonstrated in the current national
health reform debate, there is very little vision concerning what our health
delivery system should look like. To a large extent, policy makers,
legislators and bureaucrats have been co-opted by the major providers and
private payors, and most ideas that come from government, such as
Accountable Health Organizations (AHOs) or Comparative Effectiveness
Research (CER), originate in the private sector, seized on by the public
sector as magic bullets. l° System reinvention is challenging with ongoing
innovations in science and technology, but the goal of universal coverage,
as desirable as it is, needs to be placed in a context that is meaningful at
both the macro and micro levels.
Secondly, health planning is necessary, because a convincing case has
not been made that competition saves money or improves quality. All too
often, regulation is a response to market failures or abuses, but without
strategic planning backing regulatory responses, such interventions are stop
gap measures that often only invite abuses in other areas of the delivery
system. A third rationale for planning rests on the fact that hospitals and
other health provider entities are independent actors competing for
dominance, and so have little reason to be cooperative with one another.
Hospital leaders and governing boards are not rewarded for building
relationships with competitors, but rather devise plans around the success of
their institutions and systems. The fourth reason for government-initiated
health planning, overcoming antitrust law barriers, is related to the insular
nature of how health institutions function and the need for a public
8. Berger Comm'n Health Status Report, Berger Commission Measures Implemented,
State Health Commission Reports (July 2, 2008) (on file with author).
9. David Reeleder, Vivek Goel, Peter A. Singer & Douglas Martin, Accountability
Agreements in Ontario Hospitals: Are They Fair?, 18 J. PuB. ADMIN. RESEARCH & THEORY
161 (Jan. 2008).
10. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM'N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: IMPROVING
INCENTIVES IN THE MEDICARE PROGRAM, Chapter 2 (June 2009); see also John K. Ingelhart,
Prioritizing Comparative Effectivness Research-IOM Recommendations, 361 N. ENG. J.
MED. 325, 325-27 (July 23, 2009).
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authority to take a leadership role to forge institutional linkages that maybe
impossible to create. Fifth, a government health plan is needed to draw all
licensed entities into safety net responsibilities. Treating the poor should be
an obligation of licensure and not left to the politics of local governments or
the idiosyncrasies of the laws of tax exemption. The sixth component of
health planning is the need to recognize licensed complementary and
alternative medicine (CAM) providers in the planning process, because
there has been a proliferation of such providers, many of whom practice in
clinic settings. While CAM may still evoke controversy in some sectors,
these eclectic bodies of licensed providers have become part of the fabric of
our established health system and need to be factored into a global vision of
health delivery. Finally, the seventh reason for revitalized state health
planning is the need for a central point to coalesce health matters in a broad
sense, as a template to bring together not only traditional institutional
provider matters, but also to act as a coordinating vehicle for linkage to
broader public health concerns and regulations. There is no doubt that
moving a state into a more aggressive health planning role will require
increased resources and capacity, but here resources should be required to
finance this process and to act as regulatory partners with state planners.
Enhanced health planning could be an important vehicle for
underpinning a more rational and effective health system, but a second
equally helpful change resides in the more obscure realms of administrative
law. Typically, federal and state health legislation is implemented through a
traditional rule making procedure delineated in administrative procedure
laws and policies. The expansion of health laws, sparked by an ever
complex delivery system, has resulted in a massive rulemaking enterprise
dominated by command and control processes that annually adds
voluminous amounts of new regulatory requirements. Some regulations
may come and go, but more often the proliferation of mandates is
phenomena of layering in which new mandates are merely added on to
existing regulations. Problems abound in health care, and the usual response
of legislators and bureaucrats is both to expand existing regulatory
initiatives, as well as pass new laws, rather than merely revamp existing
structures. An example of dysfunctional regulatory creep can be seen in the
area of institutional licensure where frequent amendments are made, but the
process itself is underutilized and viewed with skepticism, so such
extensions to this body of law are rarely seen as adequate in areas such as
patient safety or charity care. In addition, health care is heavily subjected to
voluntary or private regulation, as groups like The Joint Commission (TJC)
and the National Quality Association (NCQA) spawn separate mandates
and have considerable influence over entities which they oversee as well,
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adding to regulatory burdens.11 It maybe nafve to think that revised health
planning will stem the tide of regulatory creep, but, at the very least, a more
explicit vision of the health system can provide a framework for
coordination and integration that is desperately lacking in the current
context.
This reality of expansiveness has been critiqued widely, and there are
frequently lamentations, often from the health field, to abate this seemingly
endless rule proliferation. It is unrealistic, however, given the public needs
in health and the likely growth of government involvement in health
reform, to expect regulatory expansion to abate. Rather, serious
consideration should be applied to the processes of health regulation and to
exploring reforms in the rulemaking arena that not merely reduce the
volume of mandates, but make rule making more effective. The challenges
of the regulatory state spill beyond the US borders, and a global legal
movement has been created to reform regulatory procedures to make this
arena more effective, responsive and participatory. 12 Under the auspices of
what is referred to as "new governance," efforts in Europe and Australia
have been launched to revive regulatory law, particularly in the context of
highly technical industries. New governance refers to a series of theoretical
and applied approaches to regulation. 13 It carves out a middle ground
between typical command and control models of oversight, on the one
hand, and self-regulation, on the other. There is no single model of new
governance; rather, there are a series of evolving models that have been
developed and tried in various industries around the globe. The underlying
point of new governance is that regulation, to be effective, must have
greater flexibilities built into it, and those flexibilities ought to be driven by
goals for outcomes and not processes. An example of new governance can
be seen in US health care in the adoption of an industrial engineering
process for Medicare deemed status, known as ISO 9001.14 Contrary to the
Joint Commission standards, ISO focuses on the use of quality procedures
that are unique to a given institution's needs, as opposed to a more rigid
regulatory formula applied across the hospital care sector.
While a variety of models characterize new governance, two in particular
have relevance to this essay, because they can be seen as templates
underpinning an invigorated health planning process. The two models are
11. See The Joint Commission, details found at http://www.jointeommission.org;
National Committee on Quality Assurance, details found at http://www.ncqa.org.
12. Orly Lobel, Setting the Agenda for New Governance Research, 89 MINN. L. REV.
498 (2004).
13. Id.
14. Fierce Healthcare, CMS Gives DNVHealthcare Authority to Accredit U.S. Hospitals
(Sept. 26, 2008). available at http://www.fiercehealthcare.com/story/cms-gives-dnv-
healthcare-authority-accredit-u-s-hospitals/2008-09-26.
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management-based regulation and responsive regulation. 15 Management-
based regulation is oriented around planning and calls for regulated entities
to develop their own unique solutions to particular problems. In the context
of health planning, the state health plan can be viewed as a general template
that lays out a vision for state and regional health planning. But how the
general plan is invoked to foster broad goals such as service coordination,
charity care, and public health can be tailored by regulated entities in
unique ways that frame goals which are compatible and realistic, given
individual institutional needs and capacities. In essence, management-based
regulation would allow regulated entities considerable freedom in creatively
meeting identified public health needs in a context very removed from the
traditions of "one-size-fits-all" regulation.
Responsive regulation, on the other hand, while similar to management-
based regulation, is perhaps more open-ended. 16 The state plan becomes a
document that lays out a series of aspirations that regulators wish to see
implemented in a respective jurisdiction. A responsive model concerns a
process of self-evaluation in which an institution identifies its problems,
guided by generic planning aspirations. Based on the self-evaluation, the
regulated entities engage in a bottom-up process in which they evaluate
particular problems, collect relevant supportive data, and craft unique,
distinct solutions to given problem areas.
Neither management-based nor responsive regulation is totally open-
ended, although initially may work with little or no guidance from the state,
beyond the outlines of a broad planning document. But in both referenced
models, the state actively oversees the activities of the regulated health
institution and may even negotiate with a particular entity at the front end of
the process to insure adoption of realistic compliance and meaningful
goals.1 7 The state would then continue to monitor the process through a
system of reporting and evaluation. In addition, the state might need to use
its broader powers to insure that institutional planning and problem solving
be approached in ways that spill beyond institutional borders, becoming
mechanisms for regional planning as well. To a large extent, state regulators
take on the role of negotiator between regulators and regulated, but in cases
of non-compliance retain their authority to invoke traditional regulatory
oversight and sanctions.
No doubt some will argue that the past twenty-five years have
demonstrated that state regulation is a hopeless quagmire, mired by politics
15. John Blum, A Revisionist Model of Hospital Licensure, 2 REG. & GOVERNANCE 48-
64 (2008).
16. J. Braithwaite, J. Healy, K. Dwan, The Governance of Health Safety and Quality,
Commonwealth of Australia, 2005 (on file with author).
17. Id.
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and lack of resources. Health planning may be viewed as an idea that is at
best arcane and, at worst, corrupt. In addition, the idea of altering the
administrative process will be seen as an academic vision beyond the
capacity of state bureaucrats who lack the creativity and power to rearrange
the landscape of entrenched administrative law. Still, the current pathways
of regulation characterized by layering and volumous complexities cannot
be sustained. As influential as the federal government is in health
regulation, the delivery system still exists at a local level, and, at this level,
states are in a far better position to understand needs and idiosyncrasies of
local public health. The current system that allows for health institutions to
be independent actors with institutional interests spurred on by goals of
market domination is inflationary and inefficient. The law is not cast in
stone and merely is a vehicle to promote social policy. A broader vision of
health is needed to create a more coherent health structure that is responsive
to individual and collective needs, and effective planning and regulatory
reform that reworks this old labyrinth are some steps that can move us
toward a more rationalized, efficient delivery system.
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